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Minsky Conference
Levy Institute of Bard College
April 21, 1999
On Minsky’s Agenda for Reform
James Tobin
In economics, theory and policy are intimately related.  Policy recommendations are derived
from theory, and in turn theory is revealed by dicta regarding policy.  Chapter 13 of Minsky’s
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy is an unusually complete design.  Here is Hy Minsky’s conception
of a stable, prosperous, efficient, equitable capitalist system.  It is the final chapter of his 1986 book,
and I found it the most revealing exposition of Minsky’s theory and his differences from other
versions of Keynesian economics.  It is an ambitious and comprehensive manifesto.
Minsky’s objective is no less than to design a self-regulated system, one that does not
depend on frequent discretionary policy moves, whether by central banks, finance ministries,
regulators, or legislatures.  It is not that Minsky is fashionably advocating rules for policy-makers
rather than discretion.  It is not that he is trusting an Adam Smith-Gerard Debreu Invisible Hand,
although he does see an indispensable role for market competition and proposes a number of
institutions to protect and promote it.  It is not that he derogates the roles of government, either micro
or macro.  To the contrary, his self-regulating capitalist economy depends for its stability on Big
Government, the source of macroeconomic built-in counter-cyclical variations of aggregate demand
and thus of profits.
The federal government, according to Minsky, should account for about 20% of full-
employment GDP.  Full employment he identifies with 6% unemployment, although he surely and
gladly would now revise that downward in the light of recent experience.  Anyway, he rejects the
current practice of monetary policy, guessing at the “NAIRU” and trying to get there and stay there
by variation of money-market interest rates.  Instead, he wants the government to be the employer
of last resort at a fixed minimal money wage rate — via a combination of New Deal type measures,
Works Progress Administration (WPA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), National Youth
Administration (NYA).  By this device, the built-in stability effects of fiscal policy are enhanced by
the variations of applicants for the guaranteed jobs, and the nomimal wage and price level are
stabilized.  There are a good many practical difficulties in this proposal, but they are probably
surmountable.  Research on the idea continues right here at this Institute.  Whether, as Minsky
hoped, this self-regulating mechanism dispenses with the need for monetary and fiscal responses to
macroeconomic events, is I think still uncertain.
Minsky thought that Big Government stabilizes because it is comparable in size to Profits,
the macro dynamo of capitalism.  A more traditional Keynesian would explain built-in stabilizers
by aggregate demand multipliers and the investment/saving nexus, but of course profits and
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aggregate demand move together, and so do saving and investment.  So this may be distinction
without difference.
Minsky expected and favored balancing the budget when the economy is operating at full
employment, with deficits and surpluses reflecting only cyclical aberrations.  Relying on his
automatic government employment mechanism to stabilize nominal wage and prices — levels, not
rates of inflation — Minsky opposed indexation of any government (or private) monetary trans-
actions.
As we know, Minsky regarded capitalist financial markets and institutions as the principal
agents of instability, and much of his new architecture is financial reform.  Taking the Federal
Reserve, or any other central bank, out of the business of macroeconomic stabilization, in accordance
with the proposals just discussed, is one step.  In Minsky’s view, it’s a dangerous mistake to try to
stabilize the economy by affecting interest rates and asset prices.  That itself feeds speculation, in
his view.  Minsky would have the Fed vary nominal interest rates much less, and for less macro-
economic purposes.  Furthermore, his prescription of budget balance across business cycles would
tend to hold federal debt constant relative to GDP and stabilize the interest rate term structure.
Yet Minsky foresees important roles for the central bank, some revived from earlier practice,
some new.  Minsky wants to revive the discount window as the major source of bank reserves,
downgrading open market operations in federal debt instruments.  (If current predictions of federal
surpluses are correct, this may happen anyway in the next 15 to 20 years.)  Minsky likes real bills,
specific to-the-asset lending, and he thinks it would be healthy for the Fed and the commercial banks
to join in this type of finance.  It would be a good role for small banks and maybe even for regional
Federal Reserve Banks (otherwise redundant).
Minsky would make the Federal Reserve responsible for the entire financial system, not just
money markets and depository institutions.  The Fed would supplant other state and federal
regulatory authorities.  All financial enterprises, not just banks, would have access to Federal
Reserve loans and advances.  Glass-Steagall and other arbitrary divisions of financial turf, most
dating from early New Deal laws, would be erased.  Tax laws and other regulations would preserve
financial firms varying in size, purpose, and location.
In Minsky’s view, the corporation has been the source of most of the perils of instability in
modern capitalism.  The basic reason is the inherent riskiness of long-lasting special purpose
physical capital assets.  In comparison, wealth-owners want earlier liquidation.  Equity markets
appear to reconcile these differences, but only by inviting great waves of speculation.  Minksy wants
to remove the tax incentives for leveraging equity or long-term bond positions — deductibility of
corporate interest.  Indeed he wants to abolish corporate income taxation and impute undistributed
profits to individual share-owners as taxable by personal income tax.  He decries any “too big to fail”
safety nets, easing the pain by simplifying bankruptcy proceedings.  The speculative and Ponzi
finance involved in so-called hedge funds (not to be confused with Minsky’s approved hedge
finance) would doubtless persuade Minsky to advocate stronger measures.  He would not shrink
from having the Fed regulate adventurous financial enterprises.  Recent events, like the debacle of
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Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) show how rampant leverage can make it possible for firms
of modest  net worth to influence asset prices by their own transactions — they are not price takers
when they have to unwind outrageous leverage.
Minsky advocated programs to diminish the inequalities of market outcomes among
individuals.  He greatly preferred programs with good incentive effects, like the employment
supports mentioned above.  For the same reasons, and others, he disliked means-tested transfers and
recommended universal children’s allowances, to be included in taxable incomes.
Economists and economic historians will for a long time debate the interpretation of the
contrast between the high first 25 postwar years of growth and high-employment, and the succeeding
and the disappointing quarter century that followed.  Which was normal?  Which was abnorm l?
The anti-Keynesian monetarist new classical view is that the policy errors of the first period led to
the disasters of the second.  The Keynesian view is that the theories and policies of the first postwar
period were sound, that policy errors were made in the Vietnam war period and their consequences
were compounded by incredibly adverse exogenous supply shocks in the 1970s — mainly the two
big OPEC oil price increases.  In this view, in normal circumstances something like the prosperity
of 1945-1969 could be obtained, though quantitatively less impressive, without drastic changes of
policy.  Minksy’s viewpoint is different from both of these interpretations.  He attributes the
reversals of the early postwar prosperity to the inevitable evolution of capitalism, particularly
capitalist finance.  His Chapter 13 is designed to mitigate the vulnerabilities that produced these
reversals.  What would he think of the successes in the 1990s of mainstream Keynesian policies in
the hands of Greenspan, without the help of much in the way of Minsky reforms?  He would not care
to extrapolate.  He ends his book predicting that capitalists’ destructive financial in ovations could
spoil even a Minsky-designed capitalist system.
